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ABSTRACT 
Local public health systems must have the capacity to meet the surge 
requirements of a health emergency that requires an extraordinary increase in activity 
including the rapid prophylaxis of an effected community.  According to recent studies of 
paid healthcare professionals, approximately forty percent may be unable or unwilling to 
report to work during catastrophic disasters, but these questions have not yet been asked 
in the volunteer community.  The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a group of medical 
volunteers with a primary mission of support to the public health system during periods 
of surge.  
This thesis surveyed the members of a county health department MRC to 
determine their ability and willingness to volunteer in a public health emergency. The 
survey also elicited information on barriers and enablers to response and perceptions of 
community preparedness.  Both significant differences in the responses of paid versus 
volunteer health professionals regarding their ability and willingness and striking 
similarities in their responses regarding barriers and enablers to report to work were 
identified.  Volunteer motivation, cognitive dissonance and the nature of self selected 
volunteers are examined as they relate to these findings and strategies to strengthen the 
ability and willingness of MRC units to respond with the public health system are 
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As a result of the national influenza vaccine shortage during fall of 2004, our 
annual vaccination program routinely planned for 20,000 older adults at 84 senior centers 
in Nassau County, New York, was cancelled.  When the State Health Department notified 
the County Health Department that we would receive 10,000 doses of influenza vaccine 
for this program in mid-November, we had to activate emergency plans to rapidly 
administer the vaccine.  We designed this flu vaccine program using our Health 
Department Point of Dispensing (POD) Plan, part of the bioterrorism preparedness plan 
and intended to dispense medication to large numbers of people in a short period of time.  
Over the course of two days, we vaccinated 7,624 older adults at a single location at the 
local community college.  The average age of the recipients was 75 years.  This event 
was the largest single vaccine program ever conducted in New York State and 99% of the 
participants reported a high level of satisfaction. 
The event not only provided us with an opportunity to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the Health Department’s bioterrorism emergency plans for older adults 
living in the community but demonstrated to all involved the critical role of the Medical 
Reserve Corps (MRC) in meeting public health surge capacity.  Of the fifty vaccinators 
used for this event, thirty-five were MRC volunteers and fifteen were paid health 
department staff.  If there was any doubt about the value of the MRC, the program 
showed that an MRC could assist in meeting surge capacity during public health 
emergencies.  Clearly, the health department should continue to invest resources to 
ensure this capacity and capability.  As one unnamed senior citizen commented after she 
received her vaccination, “This program went very, very well, especially considering it 
was a government operation.”  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A critical new responsibility for state and local health departments throughout the 
United States is the rapid distribution of prophylactic medications to the entire population 
following a decision to initiate treatment for a widespread disease outbreak.  The 
predictive resource utilization model developed to determine staffing requirements for 
this distribution recommends staffing levels that most often exceed the number of 
2 
employees available to a health department.1  This deficit creates a public health surge 
capacity need for additional health professionals to work with health departments to 
protect the residents in the community.  The Department of Health and Human Service’s 
Office of the Surgeon General established the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) in 2002 to 
function as a clearinghouse for information and best practices to help communities 
establish, operate and sustain MRC units nationwide.   
As important as these MRC programs are, however, little research has assessed 
the responsiveness of these volunteer health professionals when they are deployed to 
work for their local health department during a public health emergency, especially in 
response to a communicable disease.  Similar studies in groups of hospital staff, 
emergency medical technicians and public health workers indicate that several factors 
determine if a worker will report to duty. Understanding the ability and willingness of 
these essential health care volunteers to report to duty with their local health department 
is crucial to ensure the effectiveness of plans that identify a role for medical volunteers to 
meet public health surge capacity needs. 
The international outbreak of the illness known as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 represent examples of recent 
disasters where health care workers and public safety employees have been reluctant to 
report for duty.2  Because volunteer health professionals are often crucial in meeting local 
health department public health surge capacity needs, it is important to identify factors 
that influence their ability and willingness to report to work.  This knowledge is 
necessary to accurately mitigate response barriers and create targeted strategies to help 
volunteers respond safely and effectively to a variety of public health emergencies.   
 
                                                 
1  Nathaniel Hupert and Jason Cuomo, Weill/Cornell Mass Prophylaxis/Vaccination Model, Vol. 1 
(New York, NY: Weill Medical College of Cornell University, 2003), 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/biomodel/index.asp  [Accessed January 19, 2006]. 
2  Aaron Levin, "Assessing First Responders' Needs Favored Over Formal  `Debriefing'," Psychiatric 
News 40, no. 20 (October 21, 2005), http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/40/20/5  [Accessed 
February 14, 2006].  J. B. Treaster, "Police Quitting, Overwhelmed by Chaos," New York Times, sec. A1, 
September 4, 2005.  David Koh, Meng Kin Lim, and Sin Eng Chia, "Risk Perception and Impact of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome  (SARS) on Work and Personal Lives of Healthcare Workers in Singapore:  
What can we Learn?” Medical Care 43, no. 7 (2005), http://www.lww-
medicalcare.com/pt/re/medcare/abstract.00005650-200507000-00006.htm  [Accessed February 20, 2006]. 
3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines two core questions.  First, what are the social and personal 
characteristics, such as fear for personal safety and family obligations, that influence the 
ability and willingness of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers to report to duties for the 
department of health during catastrophic disasters?  Second, once potential contributors 
and barriers to response are known, what actions should local health departments take to 
assure that MRC volunteers will be able and willing to report to duty? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Fundamental obligations of public health agencies responsible for population-
based healthcare include prevention of epidemics and the spread of disease, response to 
disasters and assisting communities in recovery.3  Assuring the availability of a public 
health workforce of sufficient capacity to rapidly distribute prophylactic medications is a 
responsibility of all health departments. Many of these agencies require the use of 
volunteers to meet surge capacity needs.  The County’s experiences with delivering flu 
vaccines under time constraints to large numbers of people demonstrate—perhaps unlike 
any other experience across the country—the critical function that health care volunteers 
perform in an emergency.  By providing unique data on these volunteers’ willingness and 
ability to participate, this study of Nassau County volunteers will guide those responsible 
for public health emergency preparedness with critical questions and issues to include in 
their plans.  
 
                                                 
3  James A. Harrell and Edward L. Baker, "The Essential Services of Public Health," American Public 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Historically, using medical volunteers to respond to catastrophic events, in both 
times of peace and times of war, indicate the critical role these individuals play in 
determining the outcomes of the actions.  Volunteers were essential, for example, in 
combating typhoid fever during the Spanish American War.  Typhoid killed the majority 
of U.S. soldiers during the War, in which more soldiers died from diseases than from 
enemy battle.  Over two hundred thousand volunteers, including the Rough Riders, 
overwhelmed the twenty eight thousand peacetime soldiers responsible for training, 
housing and equipping them.  Significant reforms and research emerged from this 
conflict and include development of a nurse corps and a medical reserve corps.   
Since the Spanish American War, military medicine has evolved both 
technologically and strategically.4  In response to the need for medical personnel during 
World War I, Canada’s St. John Ambulance established a reserve of approximately 2,000 
informally trained nursing volunteers as Voluntary Aid Detachment nurses to assist in 
military hospitals at home and overseas.  During the 1917 Halifax munitions ship 
explosion, and the 1918 influenza epidemic, these volunteers provided substantial 
assistance to medical and nursing personnel.  They proved a valuable asset and a positive 
influence for the future development of Canadian nursing.5 
A. IDENTIFYING CORE COMPONENTS OF A PUBLIC HEALTH 
DISASTER 
Disaster medicine specialist Dr. Eric Noji offers a definition of disaster for public 
health based on the consequences of the event on health and health services to the people 
in the affected community.  A disaster is the result of a vast breakdown in the relationship 
of humans and their environment to the degree that the community requires extraordinary 
efforts and assistance to restore health.6  
                                                 
4  Edward McSweegan, "Military Medical History: Book Review of Bullets and Bacilli: The Spanish 
American War and Military Medicine by Vincent J. Cirillo," Journal of the American Medical Association 
292, no. 4 (July 28, 2004), 506-507. 
5  L. J. Quiney, “Filling the Gaps: Canadian Voluntary Nurses, the 1917 Halifax Explosion, and the 
Influenza Epidemic of 1918,” Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 19, no. 2 (2002), 351-373. 
6 Eric K. Noji, ed., The Public Health Consequences of Disasters (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 7.  
6 
In modern times, biological threats can occur either naturally or intentionally, and 
globalization has increased speed of transmission of both infectious agents and 
information.  The speed at which the relationship of humans to their environment can 
change requires medications to be distributed much more quickly than before.  The speed 
of an emergency response directly relates to the number of people protected. 
The concept and development of model systems to distribute mass prophylaxis to 
citizens has significantly changed since the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began 
funding bioterrorism in 1999.  From 1999 to 2004, most public health agency 
bioterrorism preparedness planners developed “Points of Dispensing” (PODs) to provide 
medicine to citizens in an area of risk during a large-scale public health emergency.  
Predictive resource utilization models were developed to determine physical asset and 
staffing requirements for PODs based on local variables such as population, staff, and 
number of days and hours of operation.7  
In June, 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced 
a new pilot program to distribute medication called the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI).  
CRI provides direct funding to the twenty-one largest metropolitan areas in the United 
States to improve the operational capacity to receive, distribute and dispense Strategic 
National Stockpile assets.  Following a bioterrorism event for which antibiotics are an 
appropriate countermeasure, a CRI city must provide prophylaxis to the affected 
population within 48 hours of the time of the decision to do so.8  “Once a warning or 
valid detection is made, the ability to deliver and distribute antibiotics or administer 
vaccines is the life saving component of this (CRI) strategy.  It is frequently understated 
and underestimated, but it literally is the means to mitigate an event.”9 
A core capability of an effective response must reflect the availability of an 
adequate public health infrastructure.  Approximately 3,000 municipal, city and county 
                                                 
7 Nathaniel Hupert, “Community-Based Mass Prophylaxis: A Planning Guide for Public Health 
Preparedness,” AHRQ Publication no. 04-0044 (August 2004), 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/cbmprophyl/   [Accessed November 17, 2005]. 
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Cooperative Agreement: Guidance for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness,”  Cities Readiness Initiative(CRI)  app. 3 (July 1, 2005), 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/guidance05/pdf/appendix3.pdf [Accessed  October 22, 2005].  
9 Robert P. Kadlec (testimony, Little Hoover Commission, May 26, 2005), 
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/emergprep/KadlecMay05.pdf  [Accessed November 20, 2005]. 
7 
health departments in the United States routinely conduct disease outbreak investigations 
and control and environmental health measures such as restaurant inspections and water 
testing.  Many of these agencies also deliver clinical services including treatment of 
sexually transmitted diseases, prenatal care and childhood immunizations.  Sixty percent 
of local public health agencies throughout the country are county-based and employ a 
median of 13 full-time workers.  Approximately two-thirds of local public health 
agencies serve communities of less that 50,000 people.  Annual agency expenditures 
range from $0 to over $836 million, while the median local public health agency 
expenditure in 1999 was $621,100.10 
In 2000, the Health Resources and Services Administration in the Department of 
Health and Human Resources (HRSA) estimated that approximately 450,000 individuals 
are working in salaried public health positions, with many more contributing through 
nongovernmental organizations or on a voluntary basis.11  Limited information is 
available regarding the number of volunteers in community based agencies, but the 
national estimate is 2.85 million people.12 
                                                 
10  National Association of County and City Health Officials, Local Public Health Agency 
Infrastructure: A Chartbook (Washington, D.C.: National Association of County and City Health Officials, 
2001), http://archive.naccho.org/documents/chartbook_frontmatter1-2.pdf  [Accessed February 21, 2006]. 
11  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, The Future of the Public's Health in the 21st 
Century, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003), 116. 
12  Ibid., 361. 
8 
Very few local public health agencies, however, employ enough paid staff to meet 
the surge capacity requirements for rapid mass prophylaxis of their residents.  Although 
models vary, to distribute medications in four days, most plans anticipate a need for at 
least 500 workers for every 100,000 people served.  Approximately one-third of that staff 
requires some level of medical training for triage, screening and distribution.13  This 
shortage of paid public health staff is exemplified in Nassau County, New York. With a 
population of 1.35 million residents, the Nassau County Health Department’s staff of 350 
includes only 40 registered nurses and 5 physicians.  To provide prophylaxis to all 
residents in five days, the Health Department would need to operate 35 points of 
distribution using over 5,000 staff.  Volunteers remain absolutely essential in any 
distribution strategy, and several alternate distribution models must also be considered.        
B. THE ROLE OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
SURGE CAPACITY 
Even with adequate infrastructure and a clear understanding of the potential 
problems, health emergency response needs could easily overwhelm existing capacities.  
The ability to “surge” assets to the problem is, therefore, a core capability in planning for 
such incidents.  Surge capacity is described as the ability of a health care system to 
expand rapidly beyond the routine level of service to meet an increased demand for 
health care services in response to large-scale public health emergencies.  Surge capacity 
is a function of three factors: the volume of cases, time as a function of the volume of 
cases, and the complexity of care.  The 2003 SARS epidemic in Canada, where a 
relatively small number of patients severely challenged the Toronto health care delivery 
capability, exemplifies a limited event in terms of number, but significant in terms of 
complexity of care, and severely stressed the health system capability.14    
Concern continues that serious shortages in response capability in the long-
neglected federal, state and local public health agencies still exist, triggering 
                                                 
13  John A. Clizbe, "Challenges in Managing Volunteers during Bioterrorism Response," Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science 2, no. 4 (2004): 296. 
14  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, “Addressing Surge Capacity in a Mass Casualty 
Event: Bioterrorism and Health System Preparedness,” AHRQ Publication no. 06-0027 (2006), 
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btbriefs/btbrief9.htm  [Accessed March 5, 2006]. 
9 
uncomfortable doubts about the health care system's so-called surge capacity capabilities 
if a worst-case scenario such as a bioterrorist event were to occur.15,16   
For example, an evaluation of the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks concludes 
that the U.S. medical and public health systems needed to significantly increase 
capabilities in the public health decision making process, coordination and sharing of 
information among health organizations and professional communities, risk 
communication to the media and the public in the context of scientific uncertainty, and 
address the problems of insufficient personnel, resources and operational systems.  In 
response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, the CDC deployed over 350 employees to the five 
anthrax epicenters, including 136, or 93% of their Epidemiologic Intelligence Services 
(EIS) officers.  An attack involving more victims or more locations would have 
overwhelmed this frail network of response capabilities.17   
General Accounting Office testimony before the U.S. House Committee on 
Government Reform in 2004 indicated that although states have made progress in 
developing many important aspects of public health preparedness, no state is fully 
prepared to respond to a major public health threat.  States have improved their disease 
surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, communication capacity and the personnel 
needed to respond to public health threats; however, gaps remain in each of these areas. 
Many states lack the surge capacity staff to evaluate, diagnose and treat large numbers of 
people during a public health emergency.18 
 
 
                                                 
15  Victoria Stagg Elliott, "Public Health's Main Fear Over Bioterrorism: Surge Capacity," American 
Medical News 46, no. 8 (February 24, 2003), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=295928061&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
[Accessed January 22, 2006]. 
16  E. Gursky, T. Inglesby, and T. O'Toole, "Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public 
Health Response," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science 1, no. 2 
(2003): 97-110. 
17 Ibid. 
18  Janet Heinrich, “Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving, but Much Remains to 
be Accomplished,” GAO-04458T (February 12, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-458T 
[Accessed June 14, 2006]. 
10 
C. ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF MEDICAL VOLUNTEERS TO 
SERVE 
The ability and willingness of individuals to respond to the information and 
instructions provided in an emergent situation has been studied in relation to the response 
of citizens, as well as the responses of health care professionals.  For instance, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) reports a total of 8,096 probable cases of SARS during the 
2003 epidemic, of which 1,706 (or more than 20%) were health care workers.19  
Researchers in both North America and Asia evaluated the willingness of health care 
workers to report to work during this epidemic.  They conclude that serious concerns 
exist with regards to health care workers’ willingness to report to work during different 
types of catastrophic events.  Fear for personal and family health and lack of adequate 
personal protective equipment and training directly affect the willingness to report to 
work.20  
The willingness and ability of community residents to comply with public health 
messages during a biological emergency is critical in the development of effective 
emergency preparedness planning.  In 2003, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation funded a study 
by the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health at the New York 
Academy of Medicine.  This study evaluates the public response to instructions following 
a smallpox outbreak or a dirty bomb attack.  A phone survey of 2,545 adults found the 
following: only 10% of the respondents think their community is well-prepared to deal 
with these types of emergencies; only 20% would go to a public smallpox vaccination 
site; and 60% would have serious worries about the vaccine.21  The researcher concludes 
that terrorism response planners need to learn from the public as well as talk to the 
public. 
                                                 
19  World Health Organization, "Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response: Summary of Probable 
SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003," 
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html [Accessed March 18, 2006]. 
20  J. S. Gullion, "School Nurses as Volunteers in a Bioterrorism Event," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 
2, no. 2 (2004), 112-117.  G. C. Alexander and M. K. Wynia, "Ready and Willing? Physicians' Sense of 
Preparedness for Bioterrorism," Health Affairs  22, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 189-197. 
21  R. D. Lasker, Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning through the Eyes of the Public (New 
York: The New York Academy of Medicine, 2004), 
http://www.cacsh.org/pdf/RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf [Accessed February 17, 2006]. 
11 
We’ve been spending billions of dollars working out the logistics and 
technology of responding to terrorist attacks, and obviously that is very 
important.  But our study shows that even if the nation gets all of that 
right, the plans that are being developed now are destined to fail because 
they are missing an important piece of the puzzle: how the American 
public would react to these kinds of emergency situations.  Basically, 
current plans don’t take into account all of the risks that people would 
face, so they unwittingly put many people in very difficult decision-
making predicaments.22 
Studies of the ability and willingness of physicians, school nurses, emergency medical 
technicians and health care workers to report to work as paid employees during a disaster 
have resulted in relatively consistent findings regarding the lack of education and training 
as a barrier to response. 
A 2003 study of physicians found that although 80% are willing to continue to 
care for patients in their primary care practice in the event of an outbreak of an unknown 
but potentially dangerous illness, only 46% of these physicians believe in a professional 
duty to treat patients in an epidemic.  Since physicians who indicate a professional duty 
to treat are four times as likely to report during this type of outbreak, the study suggests 
the need for a renewed emphasis on professional obligation.  There was also a positive 
correlation between the physicians’ sense of personal preparedness and bioterrorism 
training, suggesting that emergency preparedness training might foster a greater sense of 
readiness.23  
Similarly, in a survey of school nurses in Texas, Guillion reports that as personal 
risk increases, school nurses are less willing to care for patients.  He identifies a positive 
relationship between the level of education about the nurse’s emergency response role 
and the nurse’s willingness to respond in the presence of personal risk.24   These findings 
reinforce the importance of continued education on risk and personal protection. 
                                                 
22  L. Barclay, "Public Perceptions Should be Considered in Terrorism Planning:  A Newsmaker 
Interview with Roz D. Lasker, MD," Medscape Today, September 22, 2004, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/489704 [Accessed February 20, 2006]. 
23  G. C. Alexander and M. K. Wynia, "Ready and Willing? Physicians' Sense of Preparedness for 
Bioterrorism," Health Affairs 22, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 189-197. 
24  Gullion, "School Nurses as Volunteers in a Bioterrorism Event."  
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A 2003 national sample of emergency medical technicians (EMT) in the United 
States demonstrates that EMTs were much less willing than able to respond to potential 
terrorist related incidents.  However, EMTs who had recently received terrorism related 
education were twice as likely to respond to a smallpox incident as those who had not 
been trained.  This study concludes that training, attention to interpersonal concerns, and 
instilling a sense of duty may increase EMT response rates.25  
In 2005, Qureshi reported on a survey of 6,428 health care workers from 47 health 
care facilities in the New York City area to determine ability and willingness to report to 
work during different types of catastrophic events.  Qureshi suggests a distinct difference 
between the constructs of ability and willingness and defines ability as the capability of 
the individual to report to work and willingness as a personal decision to report to work.  
Survey results indicate that health care workers are most able to report to work for a mass 
casualty incident, environmental disaster or chemical event.  They are least able to report 
during a smallpox epidemic, radiological event, SARS outbreak or severe snow storm. In 
regards to willingness, health care workers are most willing to report during a snowstorm, 
mass casualty incident or environmental disaster. They are least willing during a SARS 
outbreak, radiological event, smallpox epidemic or chemical event.  This research 
demonstrates a general ability and willingness to report to work during natural traumatic 
and environmental disasters, but only about half would report to work in a smallpox 
event.  Barriers to ability include transportation and family care.  Barriers to willingness 
are fear and concern for family and personal health.26   
A statewide survey of hospital personnel conducted in Israel during the Persian 
Gulf War examines the willingness of staff to report to work following a hypothetical 
unconventional missile attack.  Overall, 42% of the staff is willing to report to work but 
that rate increases to 86% if safety measures are provided.  Males, administrative staff 
                                                 
25  C. DiMaggio, D. Markenson, M. Fareri, G. Loo, and I. Redlener, "The Willingness of U.S. 
Emergency Medical Technicians to Respond to Terrorist Incidents," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 3, no. 4 (December 2005): 331-337, 
http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/bsp.2005.3.331 [Accessed August 9, 2006]. 
26  K. Qureshi, R. Gershon, and M. Sherman, "Health Care Workers’ Willingness and Ability to 
Report to Duty during Catastrophic Disasters," Journal of Urban Health 82, no. 3 (2005): 378-388. 
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and parents of children older that 14 years of age are the most willing to report to work in 
these circumstances.  Extensive inter-hospital variation in response was noted.27  
A 2005 survey of Florida healthcare providers assesses the levels of preparedness 
and willingness to respond to a bioterrorism attack and identifies predictive factors for 
these two constructs.  The results demonstrate that only 32% of the 2,279 respondents are 
both competent and willing to respond to a bioterrorism event.  In their local community, 
82.7% of providers are willing to respond and 53.6% within the state.  Perceived threats 
of a bioterrorism attack, perceived benefits of trainings and drills and “feeling” prepared 
are predictors of overall preparedness.28  
Local health departments play a crucial response role in national preparedness 
planning for biological emergencies, including pandemic influenza.  In 2005, the Johns 
Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness surveyed 308 employees at three health 
departments in Maryland to determine factors that may influence local public health 
workers' ability and willingness to report to duty.  This study finds that nearly half of the 
local health department workers are unlikely to report to duty during a pandemic. The 
stated likelihood of reporting to duty is significantly greater for clinical than technical 
and support staff, and perception of the importance of one's role in the agency's overall 
response is the single most influential factor associated with willingness to report.  
These researchers conclude that the perceived risk among public health workers is 
associated with several factors peripheral to the actual hazard of the event. These risk 
perception modifiers include knowledge gaps, ambiguity regarding one's exact tasks, and 
questionable ability in performing one’s role as risk communicator.  The risk perception 
modifiers are all significantly associated with a higher perceived personal risk and a two- 
to ten-fold decrease in willingness to report to duty.  These factors prove more influential 
than the perceived level of family ability to function in one’s absence. Public health 
employees who are intended to serve as the source of risk communication for their 
                                                 
27  Yaron Shapira et al, "Willingness of Staff to Report to Their Hospital Duties Following an 
Unconventional Missile Attack:  A State-Wide Survey," Israel Journal of Medical Sciences 27, no. 11-12 
(November/December 1991). 
28  Jeffrey S. Crane, "Assessment of the Community Healthcare Providers' Ability and Willingness to 
Respond to a Bioterrorist Attack in Florida," Doctor of Philosophy, University of South Florida, 1-160. 
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communities represent a community with specific perceptions that must be addressed in 
the context of emergency preparedness training.29   
A medical ethicist describes the concept of duty of care for healthcare workers as 
being neither fixed nor absolute but heavily dependent on the situational context.  The 
nature and scope of the work, presence of conflicting duties and competing obligations 
and the level of risk in the work environment all influence the limits of the duty of care.  
Policy guidelines on the duty of care should include the healthcare professionals’ duty to 
care in a public health emergency. Healthcare employers also have a set of reciprocal 
responsibilities toward their staffs, which include duties to inform, protect and support 
healthcare personnel.30 
Most research literature on ability and willingness of paid healthcare workers to 
report to work during events that affect the public health exposes serious concerns that a 
significant percentage of these individuals may perceive the risks of the event and their 
personal roles and capabilities as prohibitive.  The reports of ability and willingness 
appear similar among the various types of paid health care providers including private 
practice physicians, school nurses, emergency medical technicians, hospital workers and 
public health staff.  Approximately forty percent report that they will not be available to 
perform their duties during a disaster.  Little research exists, however, on volunteer health 
care professionals’ ability and willingness to report to duty and whether this group of 
individuals shares similar concerns and constraints.    
D. MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS (MRC) VOLUNTEERS 
Volunteering in government agencies is widespread, accounting for an estimated 
20-30% of all volunteer efforts.31  A more organized approach for utilizing medical and 
public health volunteers in the United States during catastrophic disasters was evident 
following the events of 2001.  Of particular concern were issues such as identification, 
                                                 
29  Ran D. Balicer, Saad B. Omer, Daniel J. Barnett, and George S. Everly, "Local Public Health 
Workers' Perceptions Toward Responding to an Influenza Pandemic," BioMed Central Public Health 6, no. 
99 (2006): 1-14, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99  [Accessed September 15, 2006]. 
30  David K. Sokol, "Virulent Epidemics and Scope of Healthcare Workers' Duty of Care," Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 12, no. 8 (August 2006): 1238-1241, http://www.cdc.gov/eid [Accessed October 4, 
2006]. 
31  J. Brudney, "The Effective Use of Volunteers: Best Practices for the Public Sector Community 
Service," Law and Contemporary Problems 62, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 219-255, http://links.jstor.org/ 
[Accessed February 16, 2006]. 
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credentialing, training, liability and activation of licensed health professionals, many of 
whom were spontaneously reporting to disaster scenes to offer assistance.  The Office of 
the Surgeon General established the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) in the Department of 
Health and Human Services in July 2002.  The MRC’s mission is to establish 
community-based teams of local health professionals who can contribute their expertise 
both in times of disaster and for other community initiatives.  Over 230 MRC units 
currently operate in the United States, with over 30,000 individuals registered as MRC 
volunteers who supplement existing emergency and public health agencies in the 
community.  The local MRC unit sets the requirements for MRC volunteers, and they are 
most often based on the needs of the sponsoring agency.32 
In 2002, the Office of the Surgeon General awarded one of the initial fifty 
demonstration project grants to the Nassau County Department of Health MRC for a 
three year period.  The Nassau County MRC uses a public health model and it assists the 
Health Department respond to public health surge capacity needs such as mass 
prophylaxis.  Nassau County provides immunity from professional liability for its MRC 
volunteers who are credentialed and deployed by the Department of Health.  The Health 
Department has deployed MRC volunteers for several events, both emergent and routine 
in nature, including response to rabies outbreaks, influenza vaccine administration 
programs and local first responder prophylaxis drills. 
All sectors of the healthcare system have plans to increase staffing in order to 
address “surge capacity” needs during mass casualty or public emergencies. Many public 
health plans include augmenting paid staff with Medical Reserve Corps volunteers. 
Several studies have evaluated the ability and willingness of paid healthcare employees to 
report to work during catastrophic events, and these studies reveal numerous issues that 
create barriers to ability and willingness to respond.  
No study as yet has evaluated the ability or willingness of healthcare volunteers to 
report during a public health or mass casualty incident.  This study’s research includes a 
survey of the 324 Nassau County MRC volunteers to evaluate their ability and 
                                                 
32  M. L. Hoard and R. J. Tosatto, "Medical Reserve Corps: Strengthening Public Health and 
Improving Preparedness," Disaster Management and Response 3, no. 2 (2005), 
http://download.journals.elsevierhealth.com/pdfs/journals/1540-2487/PIIS1540248705000039.pdf 
[Accessed October 27, 2006]. 
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willingness to participate in public health disaster response activities. The survey treats 
ability and willingness as two separate constructs and describes six event scenarios to 
which the volunteer may be asked to report.  Respondents also answered the identical 
question posed to the public health staff in the Johns Hopkins study regarding role 
significance, as this question has the highest predictive value for ability and willingness.  
MRC members identified and prioritized enablers and barriers to participation in public 
health emergencies.  The respondents also rated levels of preparedness among various 
communities and social groups.  The knowledge gained from this project will help inform 
public health policy makers when developing surge capacity plans.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study recognizes the need for healthcare systems to understand the factors 
that affect the ability and willingness of volunteer health professionals to report to work 
during a health emergency.  Public health agencies must specifically address the need to 
meet the anticipated surge of demand for syndromic surveillance, epidemiological 
investigation and mass prophylaxis for entire communities of at-risk individuals.  
A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study uses a non-experimental design with a survey tool to collect 
quantitative data on volunteers’ ability and willingness to report to work with the Nassau 
County Department of Health.  The questionnaire also asks for volunteers’ perceptions of 
levels of disaster preparedness and the activities, barriers and supports they would 
recommend to improve the system’s response. 
The methodology includes several survey research steps.  First, a survey 
instrument collected data consisting of 26 questions (Survey Tool Appendix A).  The 
questions cover the respondents’ demographic characteristics, ability and willingness to 
volunteer for work during various types of catastrophic events, barriers to ability and 
willingness. It also includes narrative responses regarding County preparedness priorities, 
and barriers and enablers to volunteering during public health emergencies.  The survey 
was made available to all 324 Nassau County Department of Health Medical Reserve 
Corps (MRC) volunteer members as of July 20, 2006.  MRC members are 18 years of age 
or older and speak English to the extent that they can communicate easily with other 
English speakers. The large majority of MRC volunteers are New York State licensed or 
certified health professionals, including: physicians, nurses, pharmacists, social workers, 
dentists, emergency medical technicians and veterinarians, while a small proportion are 
in the occupational category of non-health care professionals. All MRC members have 
literacy skills and can read at least at an 8th grade reading level. They meet the Nassau 
County Department of Health credentialing qualifications, including a check of current 
licensure and a criminal background assessment completed by the Nassau County Police 
Department.  
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Second, respondents were selected from a list of current MRC members.  These 
members participated in this study by completing an anonymous survey on their ability 
and willingness to volunteer with the Nassau County Health Department during public 
health emergencies.  Medical Reserve Corps members were contacted a total of three 
times between July 20, 2006 and September 15, 2006.  On July 20, 2006, all MRC 
members who attended a MRC training meeting on that date were asked to complete the 
survey.  The researcher introduced the purpose of the study and asked that MRC 
members complete and return the questionnaire in a sealed envelope at the end of the 
meeting.  On August 1, 2006, and September 15, 2006, all MRC members received the 
survey by mail.  The survey was mailed out on two separate occasions to maximize the 
return rate.  The survey in the August 1, 2006, mailing included an introductory letter 
(Appendix B – August 1, 2006, Cover Letter) explaining that the survey was the same 
one that was distributed at the MRC meeting on July 20, 2006.  The letter explained that 
only members who had not completed the survey in July should respond to this current 
request.  Similarly, the letter (Appendix C – September 15, 2006, Cover Letter) 
accompanying the survey in the September 15, 2006, mailing explained the same thing.  
The letter explained that only members who had not completed the survey in July or 
August should respond to this final request.   
Third, a first attempt to administer the questionnaires occurred during a MRC 
training meeting on July 20, 2006.  At that meeting, the researcher announced that the 
surveys were available. MRC members who were interested in participating could take a 
survey packet from the registration table and either complete it at the meeting and deposit 
into a sealed box, or take it home to complete and mail it back in the pre-addressed, 
stamped envelope.  MRC members were informed that participation in the survey was 
strictly voluntary, and that their participation or non-participation would in no way affect 
their membership status or role in the MRC.  Sixty-eight MRC members attended the 
July 20, 2006 meeting.  The researcher introduced, explained and distributed the survey, 
and MRC members either completed and returned it in sealed envelopes prior to leaving 
the meeting, or mailed it to the researcher following the meeting.  Fifty-eight surveys 
were collected as a result of the July 20, 2006 MRC meeting.    
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Fourth, the researcher mailed each of the 324 MRC members a survey packet 
which contained a copy of the survey (Appendix A); a cover letter (Appendix B or C) 
which described the purpose of the survey and the procedure for its completion; and a 
return, self-addressed, postage paid envelope. MRC members were asked to complete the 
survey and return it in the enclosed envelop. Respondents were instructed NOT to place 
any personal identifying information on the survey.  Ninety-five surveys were returned in 
response to the August 1, 2006, mailing.  On September 15, 2006, the survey was mailed 
for the second time to all 324 MRC members with a cover letter explaining the purpose 
of the study and identifying the survey as the same one previously sent on August 1, 
2006.  The cover letter directed the recipients to complete and return the survey only if 
they had not done so in response to the previous requests on July 20, 2006, and August 1, 
2006.  Those who agreed to participate were asked to complete the survey and return it to 
the Health Department MRC Office in the enclosed postage paid envelope.  Forty-five 
surveys were returned in response to the September 15, 2006, mailing. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESPONSE 
Between July 20, 2006, and October 30, 2006, 198 completed surveys were 
received from a total of 324 Medical Reserve Corps members.  Although a 61.1% survey 
response rate represents a reasonable return from a mail questionnaire, the first analytical 
step involves a comparison of the characteristics of the survey respondents to the total 
MRC population to check on whether the sample analysis adequately represents all 324 
members. 
Overall, those who answered the questionnaire are very similar to the total MRC 
population.   Figure 1 below shows that the share of women and men in the sample nearly 
match the MRC as a whole.  Approximately 65% of the 324 MRC members are men, 
compared to 62% of the sampled respondents.  Figure 1 also shows that the average age 
of the total MRC population and the sample are virtually identical.  The total population 


























Sample (n=198) MRC (n=324)
 
Figure 1.   Comparison of Age and Sex of Survey Respondents to MRC Population  
 
One source of potential difference between the sample and the total population 
may be occupation.  Persons with very different time commitments in their daily routines 
often do not respond to surveys in like manner.  In this survey, however, the occupational 
distribution of the sample compares very favorably with the total population.  Figure II 
shows that, although the largest single occupational group in both the total population and 
the sample–physicians–are underrepresented in the survey, the difference is small.  All 























































Sample (n=198) MRC (n=324)
 
Figure 2.   Comparison of the Most Frequent Primary Occupations of the Total  
MRC Population and the MRC Survey Respondents  
 
Figures in Table 1 below provide a complete list of the occupational groups and 
their relative share in the MRC population and the sample.  In addition to the relative 
distribution of these occupational groups, these figures also show the significant 
heterogeneity of the volunteers responding to the survey.  Although one-third of the 
respondents are physicians, the rest of the group involves other professional specialties 
who play a different role in an emergency response and possess various levels of skill and 
experience.  This diversity offers an opportunity in the following analyses to examine 








 % of Total MRC 
Population (n=324) 
% of MRC Survey 
Sample (n=198) 
Physician 31.8 28.8 
Nurse 13.9 14.1 
Psychologist 8.6 8.1 
Dentist 8.0 9.6 
Social Worker 4.6 8.1 







Pharmacist 2.2 3.0 
Table 1.   Occupational Distribution  
 
The following analysis relies on a survey sample that is clearly representative of 
the total MRC population in the Nassau County Department of Health.  The results, 
therefore, provide accurate indications of the characteristics of MRC volunteers who will 
or will not be willing and able to respond to various types of emergency events.  They 
should also provide emergency planners with valuable insights into whom they may rely 
on to respond during an emergency and how they might help increase and ensure an 
adequate level of participation. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
This chapter examines the willingness and ability of volunteers in Nassau County 
to serve during an emergency through the eyes of those who responded to the survey.  As 
noted in the last chapter, these survey respondents are strongly representative of the total 
group of MRC members.  Therefore, the analysis represents a unique portrait of a 
county’s volunteers’ views on their own preparation to serve, and the county’s general 
preparedness in case of a medical crisis.  During the survey, these volunteers had an 
opportunity to offer their views on how well various special populations in the county 
were prepared to face a medical emergency. 
This sample population consists of a group of professional healthcare providers 
who had volunteered with the county health department MRC prior to agreeing to 
complete this survey on ability and willingness.  These individuals are a group of 
volunteers who had already agreed to membership in the MRC and publicly committed to 
volunteering.  The respondents in this survey vary significantly from spontaneous 
unidentified volunteers who respond to an incident scene on an impromptu basis and 
offer their assistance.  The MRC volunteers are openly identified as volunteers in their 
community. 
A. WHO ARE THESE VOLUNTEERS? 
A majority of these volunteers are married and living with at least one person in 
their household.  More than three fourths (76.7%) of the respondents say they were 
married; 14% are divorced or separated, and 9.3% report they are single.  Survey 
respondents average approximately three persons living in their household (2.88).  A 
small share (11%) lives alone. 
The majority of the group is also active in the labor force.  Although not 
surprising given their average age of 56 years, almost 70% of survey respondents 
(69.7%) report that they are currently employed on a full time basis.  Another sixteen 
percent work part time (15.7%).  Only roughly one in ten volunteers (14.6%) say they 
were not currently employed at the time of the survey.  The group’s commitment to the 
labor force is also steady.  Approximately half (53.3%) of the respondents work during 
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the week and approximately half (53.8%) indicate they work both on weekends and 
weekdays.  Sixty percent of the respondents (61.1%) report that they work more than 8 
hours per day, while 32.3% report working between 4 to 8 hours daily.  When asked to 
indicate the times of day they usually work, 81% report work during the daytime, 33% 
work evenings and 12% report working night hours.  
Any obligations to their jobs that might influence their willingness and ability to 
serve during an emergency are not the only source of potential barriers to participation.  
Well over half have some form of household social obligation.  Approximately 40% of 
the respondents indicate a responsibility to care for children (38.4%).   One of every five 
(19.2%) note a responsibility for the care of elders either in their home or nearby, and 
almost half have pets (40.9%). 
These apparent family and household obligations, however, are not necessarily 
insurmountable.  The survey asked the respondents three questions to elicit information 
on whether they would have help available for these responsibilities.  The first question 
asked if other people are available to care for the respondent’s responsibilities in their 
absence.  More than three-quarters of the respondents (77%) indicate that others could 
take care of their responsibilities in their absence.  Figure 3 below also shows that when 
asked, “Do you have other people available who could take care of these responsibilities 
for you in your absence?” over one in five say they do not or are not sure.  The potential 
for a significant share of these volunteers not responding during an emergency is clearly a 
possibility. 
 












The second question asked if other people are available to assume the 
respondent’s responsibilities in their absence during an emergency.  Again, more than 
three-quarters of the respondents (77%) indicate that others could assume their 
responsibilities in their absence during an emergency.  Figure 4 presents a summary of 
responses to the question, “Do you have other people available who could take care of 
these responsibilities in your absence during an emergency?” 
 









The third question addresses help with responsibilities if the respondent’s spouse 
or partner has to report to their work during an emergency.  About two-thirds of the 
respondents (65%) indicate that their spouse or partner does not have to report to work 
during an emergency.  Figure 5 presents a summary of responses to the question, “Does 
your spouse or partner have to report to work during emergencies?”  Once again, a 
significant minority–in this case almost one-third of the respondents–suggests that other 
obligations might inhibit their response to an emergency even when they were willing 
and able to volunteer. 
 














Overall, county volunteers are both routinely committed to the labor market and 
their jobs and have extensive responsibilities in their households.  Yet more than three 
quarters also report that they have assistance with those responsibilities if and when they 
are absent during an emergency situation.  A potentially critical issue for these volunteers 
might be, however, that this anticipated assistance would come from a partner or spouse 
in the same household.  Depending on household members to support an MRC volunteer 
may broaden the range of concerns.  Are the MRC volunteers willing to serve in a 
medical crisis without assurances that their household partner or spouse or more general 
obligations are secure? 
B. ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS 
The research literature on volunteers strongly suggests that people volunteer 
because of needs and motives that are important to them.  The volunteer activity must 
fulfill those needs to ensure sustainability of the volunteer effort.33  MRC members are a 
group of volunteers who have previously agreed to membership in this Health 
Department sponsored organization.  This type of volunteer is significantly different than 
the spontaneous unaffiliated volunteer who appears at the scene of an emergency and is 
then incorporated in the response.  Few studies address the motivations and behaviors of 
pre-identified professional volunteers in predicting their response to public health 
emergencies where there is a threat of illness for both the volunteer and their families 
who reside in the affected community.  
The respondents were presented with a series of six situations and asked to 
respond about their ability to respond and their willingness to respond.  The respondent 
chose from three options regarding ability and three options regarding willingness.  The 
options are willing to volunteer, not willing to volunteer and not sure.  The survey tool 
defines ability as capability, i.e. do they have the means and resources to volunteer.  
Willingness is described as a personal decision, i.e. an intention to volunteer.  These 
situations are described in the survey tool as follows: 
                                                 
33E. Gil Clary, Mark Snyder, Robert D. Ridge, Peter K Miene and Julie A. Haugen, "Matching 
Messages to Motives in Persuasion: A Functional Approach to Promoting Volunteerism," Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology 24 (1994): 1129–1130. 
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1. Routine annual influenza programs suspended due to vaccine shortage. 
Points of Distribution (PODs) need to be staffed with MRC to rapidly 
administer available vaccine to thousands of citizens. 
2. Smallpox outbreak in Nassau County.  200 patients admitted to 10 
hospitals.  DOH to establish Smallpox vaccination PODs with MRC. 
3. A Category 3 hurricane results in the evacuation of all residents south of 
Sunrise Highway.  MRC is needed to provide care for individuals in a 
special needs shelter operated by the Health Department. 
4. Confirmed nerve agent release in Roosevelt Field Mall.  MRC asked to 
assist with patient triage at local hospital emergency departments. 
5. Radioactive explosive device (dirty bomb) detonated at Jones Beach 
Marine Theatre.  MRC asked to assist answering calls at telephone center 
for the thousands of residents who are calling the Health Department for 
direction. 
6. Six confirmed cases of H5N1 (Avian) Influenza in NYC.  One suspect 
case in Nassau.  Nassau to distribute antivirals to identified at-risk 
populations with assistance of MRC. 
The responses are divided into two categories.  The first category is the single positive 
response of “able or willing to volunteer.”  The second category includes both “not 
willing” and “not sure” as “not able or willing.”  The findings of these questions indicate 
that approximately 80% of the MRC volunteers surveyed are both willing and able to 
respond to assist in public health emergencies.  Figure 6 displays the respondents’ report 
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Figure 6.   Ability and Willingness to Respond to Specific Public Health Emergencies 
 
A similar response was obtained to the questions regarding concern of personal 
exposure to a chemical agent or a biological agent while working as an MRC volunteer.  
Almost ninety percent (86%) of the respondents report they were either not at all 
concerned (29%) or only moderately concerned (57%) about exposure to chemical or 
biological agents.   
C. PERCEPTION OF SIGNIFICANCE OF ROLE IN ORGANIZATION 
RESPONSE 
Previous research suggests that paid healthcare workers are more or less willing to 
volunteer during an emergency depending on their own perceptions of the importance 
their contribution would make to the overall response effort.  These Nassau MRC 
volunteers were asked a similar question.  They rate the significance of their role as an 
MRC volunteer in the overall health department response to emergencies.  More than  
90% of the respondents report their role as either moderately or highly significant.  
Figure 7 displays the reported significance of the respondents’ role as MRC volunteers in 











Figure 7.   Perception of Significance of Role in Organization Response 
 
Respondents specify their availability if they are able and willing to volunteer, or 
not sure if they can volunteer.  Volunteer availability is high. Seventy percent of the 
respondents (69.9%) indicate they are available both on weekdays and weekends and 
about seventy percent state they are available for daytime (73.7%) and evening (69.7%) 
assignments.  More than half (51%) of the respondents are willing to work at night. 
D. BARRIERS TO ABILITY 
The survey identifies six possible barriers to the ability to respond and instructed 
the respondents to rate the importance of those barriers if they were not able or unsure 
about volunteering during a public health emergency.  The six barriers include child care, 
lack of training, elder care, personal health problems, pet care obligations and other job 
commitments.   Over one third of the respondents (34.5%) indicate that other job 
commitments represent an important barrier to their ability to respond.  More than forty 
percent (42.4%) of respondents also rate lack of training as a moderately important 
barrier to response ability.  These job requirements stand in stark contrast to the social 
obligations that previous research suggests could be primary obstacles to emergency 
response.  For instance, approximately seventy percent of all respondents report that child 
care (72.3%) is not an important barrier to their ability to respond during an emergency.   
Obligations related to elder care (76.5%), personal health (69.9%), and pet care (73.4%) 
also are not rated as important barriers.  Figure 8 shows the full variability among these 
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Figure 8.   Reasons MRC Members May be Not Able or Not Sure about  
Volunteering during a Public Health Emergency 
 
A second question on ability asked the respondent to briefly describe what would 
need to change to make it possible to volunteer if they are not able or not sure about 
volunteering during a public health emergency.   Of those who are not able, forty percent 
(39.3%) indicate a change was necessary regarding the safety and health for themselves 
and their families, and thirty five percent (34.4%) state a change was needed regarding 
their work coverage.  Unsuitable training (14.8%), competing commitments (6.6%) and 
pets (4.9%) are also identified but much less significant as obstacles to ability.  
E. BARRIERS TO WILLINGNESS 
According to Qureshi,34 willingness to volunteer is a separate dimension of a 
person’s decision-making process.  It reflects a personal decision based on motivation or 
intention to volunteer.  This survey of MRC volunteers identifies four barriers to 
willingness to respond and instructed the respondents to rate the importance of those 
barriers if they are not willing or unsure about volunteering during a public health 
emergency.  The four barriers identified are concern for personal health and safety, lack 
of personal protective equipment, concern for health of family members and lack of 
information regarding risk.                                                     
34  Qureshi, Gershon, and Sherman, "Health Care Workers’ Willingness and Ability to Report to Duty 
During Catastrophic Disasters." 
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Sixty percent (59.1%) of the respondents rate personal health and safety concerns 
as moderately important, while the three other concerns are rated by half of the 
respondents as very important reasons they were not willing or not sure about 
volunteering during a public health emergency.  The three concerns rated as very 
important by the respondents are lack of personal protective equipment (46.2%), family 
member health concerns (50%) and lack of information on risk (46.9%).  Perhaps the 
most significant finding regarding these barriers to willingness is that eighty percent of 
all respondents rate all four areas of concern as moderately or very important.  
Apparently, these respondents possess a global concern about the potential impact of 
issues beyond their own control that may affect their willingness to respond.  Figure 9 
presents the responses to the question on reasons MRC members may be not willing or 
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Figure 9.   Reasons MRC members May be Not Willing or Not Sure about  
Volunteering during a Public Health Emergency 
 
F. LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS  
Preparedness, at both a community and an individual level, is difficult to define 
and measure.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) defines 
preparedness as “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment 
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necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond 
to, and recover from major events.”35  HSPD-8 mandates developing a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal utilizing a capabilities-based planning approach.  The 
Interim National Preparedness Goal identifies strengthening medical surge and mass 
prophylaxis capabilities as one of the seven national priorities.36   
Elsewhere, preparedness is described as both a process and an effect.  The process 
of preparedness provides all partners with the opportunity to collaborate on strategies that 
contribute to a collective operational readiness. As an effect, it contributes to both risk 
reduction (mitigation) and operational effectiveness through planning, training, 
equipping, exercising and evaluating the ability to prevent, protect from, respond to or 
recover from emergency events.37 
Ten indicators evaluate state level public health preparedness.  These include the 
following:  ability to accept and distribute the Strategic National Stockpile; laboratory 
capacity; availability of lab scientists and nurses; capability for influenza surveillance; 
hospital bed surge capacity; percent of population receiving vaccinations for influenza 
and pneumonia; health information technology; and the status of the budget for public 
health.38  These preparedness effects can also be understood as measures of risk 
reduction and operational effectiveness such as baseline readiness (percent of population 
receiving vaccinations for influenza and pneumonia); resources (budget, laboratory 
capacity, hospital bed surge capacity); planning (capability for influenza surveillance, 
health information technology); and training (availability of lab scientists and nurses, 
ability to accept and distribute the Strategic National Stockpile).   
                                                 
35  Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Directive on National Preparedness: Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, no. 51 (December 22, 2003): 1822, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm  [Accessed February 3, 2007]. 
36  United States Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal: Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (March 31, 2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/InterimNationalPreparednessGoal_03-31-05_1.pdf  [Accessed 
February 2, 2007]. 
37  U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, A Hearing on the Stafford Act: A Path 
Forward for the Nation's Emergency Preparedness and Response System, 
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=259735 [Accessed July 7, 2006]. 
38  Trust for America's Health, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health from Diseases, Disasters 
and Bioterrorism (December 2006), 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror06/BioTerrorReport2006.pdf  [Accessed December 24, 2006]. 
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At the community level, as yet no standard benchmarks exist to evaluate a level of 
emergency preparedness, nor is there a generally accepted definition of the term.  In 
designing the survey for this study of MRC volunteers, questions on preparedness are 
intended to identify the MRC member’s own perceptions of preparedness and to evaluate 
the effect of those perceptions on opinions about their own likely behavior and the 
conditions facing the larger community.  
For example, the MRC respondents evaluate the level of emergency preparedness 
in their communities and for specific subgroups using a 5-point scale ranging from 
unprepared to very prepared.  The respondents rate the level of preparation of their 
county, community and family.  Approximately half of the respondents rank the county 
(53.6%), their community (49.4%) and their own family (47.6%) as somewhat prepared, 
which is below a rating of prepared.  The ranking of the respondent’s local community is 
consistently lower than that of their county or their family at all levels of preparedness.  
Figure 10 presents the responses to the perceived of level of preparedness in county, 

















Figure 10.   Perceived Level of Preparedness in County, Community and Family 
 
The respondents then rate the level of preparation for a public health emergency 
such as Hurricane Katrina for ten groups of people.  The ten groups includes the 
following: county leaders and politicians; local first responders; local voluntary 
organizations; low income groups; high income groups; elderly; hospitals; persons with 
pets; homeless; and non-English speakers.   
In general, most respondents rank all groups as less than prepared.  More than 
seventy percent of the respondents rate four groups of people as totally unprepared.  
These groups include the low income (76.5%), the elderly (71.7%), the non-English 
speakers (76.4%) and the homeless (91.9%).  Half of the respondents report that the high 
income (55.1%) and the leaders/politicians (50.3%) are somewhat prepared.  All other 
groups receive a lower rating in this category.  Groups receiving the highest percentages 
for being prepared are the first responders (27.4%), volunteer organizations (29.8%) and 
the hospitals (30.3%).  Figure 11 displays the ranking of levels of preparedness in the ten 
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Figure 11.   Perceived Level of Preparedness in Specific Groups 
 
G. PRIORITIES TO IMPROVE PREPAREDNESS 
Respondents then list, in priority order, the five steps that local officials should 
take to improve the County’s preparedness for a public health emergency.  Respondents 
were instructed to list the most important step as Priority #1.  Public education and 
awareness is the most important priority for preparedness.  Half of the respondents 
(50.7%) identify public awareness and education as the first priority for local officials.  If 
not the first priority, public awareness and education are ranked by the others as one of 
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Figure 12.   Priority Improvements in Preparedness 
 
H. BARRIERS TO RESPONSE 
The respondent wrote brief phrases describing the two most significant barriers or 
problems preventing them from fulfilling their job requirements during a disaster.  This 
question is different than the previous questions on barriers to ability and barriers to 
willingness.  The question does not distinguish between ability and willingness 
constructs.  Rather, the question asks about fulfilling job requirements rather than 
reporting to work, and the respondent wrote responses without the prompting of answers 
in a multiple choice question.  
The eight barriers the respondents identify follow the same order of frequency in 
both positions.  Family responsibilities and family safety rank as the highest barrier 
(28.1%, 27.7%), followed by employment (20.3%, 22.3%) and personal health (19.5%, 
18.8%).  The fourth most frequently identified barrier, travel and access (18.8%, 13.4%), 
ranks close to the top three barriers.  These four barriers are identified more than three 
times as frequently as the remaining four barriers.  Figure 13 identifies these barriers to 
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Figure 13.   Barriers to Fulfilling Job Requirements During a Disaster 
 
I. ENABLERS FOR RESPONSE 
These volunteers also wrote brief phrases describing the two most significant 
factors that would assist them in fulfilling their job requirements during a disaster.  The 
eleven enablers the respondents identify follow the same order of frequency in both 
positions for the three highest rated items.  Assurance that their family would be cared for 
(27.5%, 28.1%) is rated most important in both positions and is rated at a significantly 
higher percentage than all other issues.  Adequate training (16.2%, 20.2%) and resolution 
of employment-related conflicts (13.4%, 18%) are ranked as second and third 
respectively. 
In the first position, communication (14.1%) and access/transportation issues 
(12%) are ranked forth and fifth, and in the second position equipment (12.4%) and 
communication (5.6%) are ranked as fourth and fifth.  Skills, plans and awareness are 
consistently ranked as the least frequent issues.  Figure 14 describes the enablers to 
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Figure 14.   Enablers to Fulfilling Job Requirements During a Disaster  
 
These responses demonstrate that MRC volunteers are both like and unlike other 
paid healthcare professionals.  They are exceptionally willing and able to report to work 
during emergencies, but at the same time also face significant barriers.  In general these 
medical volunteers are older, married, still working full time and have significant social 
responsibilities.   
More than one third state that their work commitments and lack of training 
represent important barriers to their ability to respond, as compared to the social 
obligations that previous research reports as a primary obstacle.  Perhaps most 
importantly, unlike paid public health professionals, MRC volunteers identify their roles 
as being significant in assisting the health department during an emergency.     
Quite similar to other studies, respondents are almost universally concerned about 
personal health and safety, personal protective equipment, family health and lack of 
information on risk as possibly affecting their willingness to respond.  Most MRC 
members feel that community groups are less than adequately prepared and they identify 
improvement in public awareness and education as the most important priorities for the 
county to overcome these barriers.   
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These MRC volunteers demonstrate that, even with the high degree of 
commitment overall, significant variability exists in ability and willingness to respond.  
Therefore, the task of managing the MRC volunteers deals with the diversity and all that 


























The most recent research on ability and willingness of paid healthcare workers to 
report to work during events that affect the public health reveals serious concern that a 
significant percentage of these individuals may perceive the risks of the event and their 
personal roles and capabilities as prohibitive.  Three studies of ability and willingness 
were done in the United States in 2005.  Qureshi’s survey of 6,428 health care workers in 
the New York City area found that only about half would report to work in a smallpox 
event.39 Crane’s survey of Florida healthcare providers demonstrated that only 32% of 
the 2,279 respondents were both competent and willing to respond to a bioterrorism 
event.40  The Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness survey of 308 
employees at three health departments in Maryland found that nearly half of the local 
health department workers are likely not to report to duty during a pandemic.41   
The survey conducted for this study focuses on a different population—the 324 
members of the Nassau County Department of Health MRC.  Drawing on the previous 
studies noted above, it focuses on ability and willingness as two separate constructs.  
Respondents identify their intentions to voluntarily respond with the health department 
during a public health emergency and rate the significance of their role in fulfilling the 
health department responsibilities during a disaster.  Respondents identify and prioritize 
the five steps that local officials should take to improve the county’s preparedness for a 
public health emergency; lists the two most significant barriers preventing them from 
fulfilling their job requirements during a disaster; and write down the two most 
significant factors that would assist them in fulfilling their job requirements during a 
disaster. 
                                                 
39  Qureshi, Gershon, and Sherman, "Health Care Workers’ Willingness and Ability to Report to Duty 
during  Catastrophic Disasters." 
40  Crane, "Assessment of the Community Healthcare Providers' Ability and Willingness to Respond 
to a Bioterrorist Attack in Florida." 
41  Balicer, Omer, Barnett, and Everly, "Local Public Health Workers' Perceptions Toward 
Responding to an Influenza Pandemic."  
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Nassau County volunteers, according to this survey, are generally well prepared 
and willing to serve during an emergency.  They also think they play an important role in 
the health department response.  Unfortunately, these knowledgeable medical 
professionals also believe that many groups and communities in the county are 
significantly unprepared for an emergency. 
It is important to recognize that this sample population consists of a group of 
professional healthcare providers who had volunteered with the county health department 
MRC prior to completing this survey on ability and willingness.  What impact their 
professional and volunteer status would have on their actual behavior at the time of an 
emergency, and how their behavior might differ from other volunteers, represent the key 
questions for the remainder of this analysis.  
B. RECAP OF SURVEY FINDINGS 
The survey findings identify important demographic information on this group of 
volunteer health care professionals and also demonstrate some significant differences 
between MRC volunteers and paid health care workers.  The average age of the MRC 
volunteer in this study is 54.5 years, almost ten years older than the national averages.  In 
the United States, the average age of registered nurses was 46.8 years of age in March 
2004, up from 45.2 in 2000.42  The average age of physicians was 45.7 years.43  
Three-fourths of the MRC study group report they are currently married  Seventy 
percent work full time, and sixty percent report working more than eight hours every day.  
Forty percent of the MRC respondents are responsible for children, forty percent  are 
responsible for pets and twenty percent are responsible for an elder person. 
MRC members who are able and willing to volunteer are also readily available.  
Volunteer availability in this group is high.  Seventy percent of the respondents report 
that they are available for assignments on both weekdays and weekends, during the 
daytime and during the evenings; over half are willing to work at night.  These Nassau 
                                                 
42  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration, 
Preliminary Findings: 2004 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (March, 2004), 
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/reports/rnpopulation/preliminaryfindings.htm  [Accessed January 19, 
2007]. 
43  North Carolina Health Professions Data System and Southeast Regional Center for Health 
Workforce Studies, 2005 North Carolina Physicians: Factsheets (October 2005), 
http://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/hp/FactSheets/MDTrainFS03.pdf  [Accessed January 19, 2007]. 
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County volunteers are a group of older health professionals who continue full time 
employment and have both significant responsibilities at home and significant assistance 
with these responsibilities in their absence.   
1. Ability and Willingness to Report to Work  
The MRC volunteers’ ability and high personal willingness to volunteer is 
significantly higher than the results from several studies of paid healthcare workers, 
suggesting that nearly half are likely not to report to duty during a catastrophic public 
health emergency.44  Approximately three-fourths of all MRC survey respondents 
indicate both an ability and willingness to volunteer in all six types of emergencies 
situations described.   
In general, this sampled group appears more organized and motivated to 
volunteer, perhaps resulting from the fact that they volunteer in the MRC and 
consequently have more available resources than the general population of health 
professionals.  MRC groups are, in essence, “privileged” groups of individuals who 
indicate a high ability and willingness to respond in spite of significant barriers and 
concerns. 
2. Comparison of Perception of Role Significance between Paid and 
Volunteer Healthcare Professionals 
Volunteers’ perceptions of how useful they are to the response of the health 
department sharply influence how they behave even if, in general, they say they are able 
and willing to become involved.  These survey respondents are unlike the population 
studied in most previous studies of the ability and willingness of people to volunteer 
during an emergency.  This group expresses a very high level of ability and willingness, 
reaching a full 75% of the group.  What, then, if anything, differentiates those who would 
respond during an actual event from those who would or could not? 
MRC volunteers’ perception of the importance of their role in the health 
department’s overall response is far greater than that of the paid public health staff in the 
                                                 
44  DiMaggio, Markenson, Fareri, Loo, and Redlener, "The Willingness of U.S. Emergency Medical 
Technicians to Respond to Terrorist Incidents ." Qureshi, Gershon, and Sherman, “Health Care Workers’ 
Willingness and Ability to Report to Duty during Catastrophic Disasters.” Shapira et al, "Willingness of 
Staff to Report to Their Hospital Duties Following an Unconventional Missile Attack:  A State-Wide 
Survey." Alexander and Wynia, "Ready and Willing? Physicians' Sense of Preparedness for Bioterrorism." 
Crane, "Assessment of the Community Healthcare Providers' Ability and Willingness to Respond to a 
Bioterrorist Attack in Florida." Gullion, "School Nurses as Volunteers in a Bioterrorism Event."  
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Johns Hopkins study.  Ninety percent (90%) of the MRC volunteers report they play a 
moderately or highly significant role in the county health department’s emergency 
response, indicating a high degree of engagement and motivation.  This response is 
substantially greater than the response of paid county health department employees who 
answered the identical question in the 2005 Johns Hopkins survey.  In the Johns Hopkins 
study, sixty percent (62%) of the paid employees in the three county health departments 
in Maryland report that they play a significant role in the agency’s overall response.  The 
likelihood of reporting to duty is significantly greater for clinical than technical and 
support staff and perception of the importance of one's role in the agency's overall 
response is the single most influential factor associated with willingness to report.45   
In the Hopkins study, researchers document a ten-fold increase in reported ability 
and willingness to volunteer among those who perceive their role in the emergency 
response plan to be very or moderately important.  In this MRC sample of persons 
already registered to volunteer in case of an emergency, their perceived role in the Health 
Department response plan also makes a strong difference.   
 Those who do not feel their role is very important are much less likely to 
volunteer than those who think they are very important. When asked about their ability to 
respond to a hurricane, for instance, nearly 90 percent (86.8%) of those who believed 
they have an important role in the Health Department’s plan say they would volunteer.  
Those who consider their role insignificant are 20 percentage points (68.4%) less likely to 
respond during a hurricane. 
Figures in Table 2 show the variation of these volunteers’ views toward 
emergency preparedness depending on whether they think their role in the emergency 
plan is high, moderate or not significant.  In a similar pattern to the hurricane situation 
described above, volunteers who think their role is very important are nearly four times 
more likely not to be deterred from responding because of concern over a chemical agent 
attack.  They are also roughly half less likely as those who believe their role in the county 
plan to be insignificant to consider any challenge to their personal health as a reason for 
not responding. 
                                                 
45 Balicer, Omer, Barnett, and Everly, “Local Public Health Workers’ Perceptions Towards 
Responding to an Influenza Pandemic.”  
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One likely reason for these differences relates to the perception of the significance 
of their role.  Those who believe their role is very important in an emergency do not think 
that training or skills is important to their volunteering:  68.6% report that training would 
not be a very significant inhibitor to their participation.  In contrast, those feeling their 
role is insignificant feel job training is important.  When asked directly if job 
commitments would impede their ability to serve, over half (52.6%) of those with 
insignificant roles think that their jobs would have a very important influence, compared 
to less than a third (30.6%) of those with confidence that their position in the emergency 
response plan is highly significant. 
MRC volunteers confident in their own role also express more confidence in the 
preparedness of others.  Respondents who believe that their role in the Health 
Department’s response is highly significant are also much more likely to consider the 













% able to volunteer during a hurricane 68.4 78.8 86.8 80.0 
% Not Concerned about a Chemical 
Attack 
10.5 25.6 43.4 29.0 
% Believe Training is NOT a Barrier  31.6 34.5 68.6 42.8 
% Job Requirements were Barrier 40.0 36.1 26.7 34.4 
% Family and Personal Health a 
Concern 
20.0 44.4 40.0 39.3 
% Thought County was Prepared 11.2 18.0 31.4 21.1 
Table 2.   Perceived Role Significance and Indicators of Preparedness  
 
As the figures in Table 5 show, role significance appears to be a powerful predictor of 
willingness to report to duty.  Public health organizations must address role significance 
to improve the reliability of emergency response.  Volunteer health professionals may 
come to the organization with a preconception of the importance of their role and is 
clearly demonstrated in their response to the question of the level of preparedness in the  
county.  The importance of the role of the MRC member in the health department’s 
ability to fulfill their mission must be clearly stated and repeatedly demonstrated to the 
volunteer to sustain their willingness to report.         
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C. RISK PERCEPTION MODIFIERS 
The Johns Hopkins study concludes that the perceived risk among public health 
workers is associated with several factors peripheral to the actual hazard of the event. 
These risk perception modifiers include knowledge gaps, ambiguity regarding one's exact 
tasks and questionable ability in performing one’s role as risk communicator.  The risk 
perception modifiers are all significantly associated with a higher perceived personal risk 
and a two- to ten-fold decrease in willingness to report to duty.  These risk perception 
factors prove even more influential than the perceived level of family ability to function 
in one’s absence.46   
The MRC study group documents some of the same risk perception modifiers.  
The survey identifies six potential barriers to respond and instructed the respondents to 
indicate and rate the importance of those barriers if they were unable or unsure about 
volunteering during a public health emergency.  The respondents identify other job 
commitments and lack of training as most crucial.  The survey also identifies four 
potential barriers to willingness to respond which include concern for personal health and 
safety, lack of personal protective equipment, concern for health of family members and 
lack of information regarding risk.   Eighty percent of the respondents rate all four of 
these barriers as moderately or very important.  If these risk perception modifiers result in 
a perception of increased risk and consequent decreased willingness to report to work, the 
MRC respondents in this study may be less willing than they recognize and report in the 
survey. 
D. RESPONSE BARRIERS AND ENABLERS 
The significant difference between volunteer and paid health professionals in their 
ability and willingness to report to work was not evident when the respondents specified 
issues that may interfere with reporting to work.  One of the most interesting findings of 
this research is that although MRC volunteers are far more likely than paid health 
professionals to indicate they are able and willing to respond to public health disasters, 
their answers become quite similar to the responses of the paid workers in the other 
studies when they are asked to identify barriers to ability, willingness and response.  For 
                                                 
46  Balicer, Omer, Barnett, and Everly, “Local Public Health Workers’ Perceptions Towards 
Responding to an Influenza Pandemic.” 
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example, respondents indicate that the three most significant barriers preventing them 
from fulfilling their job requirements during a disaster are family responsibilities, travel, 
and personal safety and health. 
A crucial characteristic of these highly motivated and able volunteers, however, is 
the considerable variation within the group in terms of their interests and concerns.  Their 
similarity to paid health professionals in identifying barriers suggests that this variation 
may also be an essential feature of all who are sought to respond to an emergency.   
The men in the MRC sample, for instance, report a much higher level of concern 
over the possibilities of a terror attack than did their female counterparts.  Men are almost 
twice as likely as women to express their concerns.  Similarly, a greater share of men 
(14.2%) than women (8%) in this group expresses concern about the possibilities of 
contacting a disease while responding to a biological event.  Men are also more likely 
than the female volunteers to worry about their personal health while involved in an 
emergency response.  In a biological emergency scenario, men tend to be more concerned 
about county preparedness and women are more concerned about the preparedness of 
families.  Almost ten percent more women perceive families as unprepared or only 
somewhat prepared for a biological emergency than their male counterparts, while 
slightly more than ten percent of men perceive the county as unprepared or only 
somewhat prepared for a biological emergency. 
Figures in Table 3 provide a broader glimpse into the variations between men and 
women on perceptions of preparedness.  For example, women worry about their pets to a 
far greater extent than the men in this sample, and translate that concern into the priorities 
they identify for changes in the county’s current emergency response plan.  Twenty 
percent (19.2%) of women say that responsibility for pets is very important in the 
decision to respond, compared to less than four percent (3.4%) of men.  Almost ninety 
percent (89.7%) of all respondents want the county to change priorities to include 
planning for pet care.  These differences are not due to having more household 
requirements, as measured by household composition.  Nor are they explained by having 
different involvement in the labor market or viewing job commitments and training needs 
differently. 
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Variable Men Women Total 
% Highly Concerned about Terrorist Chemical 
Agent 
17.5 9.3 14.4 
% Personal Health Very Important to Decision 
to Respond 
9.4 0.0 6.0 
% Responsibility for Pets Very Important to 
Decision to Respond 
3.4 19.2 9.4 
% Pet Owners Unprepared or Only Somewhat 
Prepared 
83.5 95.9 89.7 
% Perceive County Unprepared or Only 
Somewhat Prepared for Bio Emergency 
66.4 55.9 62.4 
% Perceive Family Unprepared or Only 
Somewhat Prepared for Bio Emergency 
63.5 72.5 66.9 
Table 3.   Perceived Levels of Preparedness by Gender 
 
Previous studies on paid healthcare providers do not specifically ask respondents to 
identify actions that would enable their actions during an emergency.  To identify 
response enablers which could provide key insights for Health Department planners, the 
MRC members in this survey wrote brief phrases describing the two most significant 
factors that would assist them in fulfilling their job requirements during a disaster.  The 
respondents indicate that assistance with assuring the care of their families during their 
deployment and providing adequate job-related training are the two most important 
factors that would assist in fulfilling their MRC role.  As key enablers and modifiers of 
risk perception, these two manageable characteristics of potential emergency responders 
should attract planners’ attention in an effort to maximize volunteers’ and paid 
professionals’ participation. 
The jobs that MRC volunteers hold routinely also form a source of variability 
within the group that have a strong impact on their likely reactions during an event.  In 
terms of their ability to respond during a hurricane, occupational groups range in their 
answers from fifty percent who think they would act to a hundred percent.  As an 
occupational group, nurses report that family protection is a serious impediment to 
responding, and want policy changes to focus on securing their households.  Not 
surprisingly, the occupational groups that consider their routine jobs an impediment to 
their volunteering also value policy changes that would provide coverage if they have to 
miss work to respond to the emergency. 
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As a source of variation among these volunteers, however, whether the person 
works full-time, part-time or is currently out of work is more important than the actual 
job. Well over two-thirds of this group works full-time (69.7%).  Still, the third that do 
not work a full-time job have a very different outlook on their volunteer status.  Ninety-
percent of those not employed full-time say they were able to respond during an 
emergency, compared with only 75.2% of the full-time workers.  Full-time workers also 
are four times more likely than part-time employees to be very concerned about a public 
health emergency, and significantly more likely to worry specifically about their personal 
health during an emergency response.  Seventy-six percent (76.6%) of full-time workers 
express concern about their personal health during an emergency compared to 52.9 
percent of part-time workers.  Volunteers who are out-of-work respond much more like 
part-time workers than their full-time employed counterparts. 
When asked directly if their routine job commitments prevent them from 
responding to an emergency, only 15.2 percent of full-time employees dismiss it as not 
important. Half of part-time workers dismiss it as a problem.  Of course, nearly all 
(95.5%) of those out of work say other job commitments do not impact their ability to 
respond in an emergency.  Nearly half of the full-time workers also want policy changes 
in the county to cover any work that they might miss during their emergency service. 
E. VOLUNTEER MOTIVATION AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
Volunteers can be motivated for many reasons. One previous study hypothesizes 
that six functions are potentially served by volunteerism. These functions include; 
volunteerism allows an individual to express humanistic concern for others; learning new 
skills while utilizing current knowledge and skills; being part of a social group and 
engaging in activities seen as important to others; the potential of improved career 
opportunities; the reduction of guilt feelings by the volunteer of being more fortunate; 
and the personal satisfaction or ego boost derived from participating in a volunteer 




and self-esteem for the actual volunteer.47   People volunteer because of needs and 
motives that are important to them and the volunteer activity must fulfill those needs to 
sustain the volunteer effort.48 
The sample population in this study had previously chosen to be MRC volunteers. 
The respondents applied for membership to the county health department MRC, agreed to 
a credentialing process that included both a professional licensure and criminal 
background check, and most had engaged in some training and exercise activities with 
the health department prior to completing this survey on ability and willingness to report 
to work.  It is possible that asking this group of health professionals who have already 
demonstrated their belief in volunteering if they have concerns regarding their ability and 
willingness to respond may have caused a cognitive dissonance between two inconsistent 
belief systems—volunteering and concern about responding to a public health 
emergency. 
Simply stated, cognitive dissonance is the mental stress that develops when a 
person holds two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent. Cognitive dissonance 
theory proposes that individuals will seek to relieve this stress by finding a way to change 
one or both cognitions to make them consistent.  Cognitive dissonance theory is about 
making sense out of an individual’s beliefs, environment and behavior, thus connecting 
motivation with cognition.49  For the health professional in the MRC, the behavior of 
volunteering may conflict with their belief system that public health emergencies might 
possibly result in threats to the health and safety for themselves and their families.  To 
remove the dissonance, either the belief or the behavior has to change.  Instead of 
changing the behavior by not volunteering in order to match the belief of possible danger, 
cognitive dissonance theory suggests that the opposite happens and belief systems adjust 
to match the current behavior.50  Because the MRC volunteer has already publicly 
                                                 
47 Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, and Haugen, "Matching Messages to Motives in Persuasion: A 
Functional Approach to Promoting Volunteerism." 
48 Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, and Haugen, "Matching Messages to Motives in Persuasion: A 
Functional Approach to Promoting Volunteerism." 1529. 
49  Elliot Aronson, "Back to the Future: Retrospective Review of Leon Festinger's--A Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance," The American Journal of Psychology 110, no. 1 (1997): 127. 
50  Robert Lindberg, "Seeking the Elusive Balance," Association Management 47, no. 1 (January 
1995): 86. 
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committed to volunteering, the volunteer may be more likely to report a higher degree of 
ability and willingness to report to work.  Cognitive dissonance theory describes this 
inconsistency as a change in the individual’s belief system (that volunteering is 
dangerous) to reduce the conflict of engaging in a behavior that is dangerous.  The MRC 
volunteer may actually change their belief so they do not have to change their behavior. 
F. SUMMARY 
It is not sufficient to ask volunteers if they are able and willing to report to work 
during emergency events.  They have already declared their intent to participate by 
joining the group, and the issues of inability or unwillingness to report to work may be in 
conflict with their behavior. 
These groups of volunteers have the opportunity to express their concerns 
regarding ability and willingness outside of  simple “yes” or “no” questions, because 
volunteers have already chosen to volunteer.  When potential conflicts were pre-
identified in the survey, the MRC volunteer indicated many of the same concerns 
included in the literature on response of paid healthcare staff in a public health 
emergency.  When these respondents wrote their concerns in brief statements, again they 
were consistent with the concerns of the paid health care professionals.  These types of 
questions may provide the respondent with the permission or recognition that barriers to 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING PUBLIC HEALTH SURGE 
CAPACITY 
The need for public health preparedness at the local level is quite clear in the 
February, 2006, statement of Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt.  At 
a Maryland pandemic flu summit in Baltimore, he commented, “Any community that 
fails to prepare and expects the federal government will come to the rescue is tragically 
wrong.  It’s not because we don’t care, don’t want to, or don’t have the money, but 
because it’s impossible.”51   
The strength of the public health infrastructure at all levels of government is a 
critical determinant of the speed and efficiency of the public health response.  The 
severity of the consequences of an ineffective response can be measured by the number 
of people affected.52 
Since the 1988 institute of medicine report, The Future of Public Health, 
the ‘disarray’ of the U.S. public health system has been broadly 
acknowledged. The impressive achievements of public health during the 
past century and their accompanying improvements in longevity created a 
sense of complacency about the underlying public health infrastructure, 
which has deteriorated markedly during the past twenty-five years. The 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declared in 2001 
that the U.S. public health infrastructure remains ‘structurally weak in 
nearly every area.’  Not until the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and 
the subsequent anthrax attacks were any large-scale investments made in 
the public health infrastructure.53 
Integration of public health emergency preparedness in the United States with 
other, more traditional, public health missions remains a challenge.  Lurie and other 
RAND researchers have remarked that public health often misses opportunities to exploit 
                                                 
51 Michael O. Leavitt, “A Nation Prepares” (lecture,  Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit, February 
24, 2006), http://flu.maryland.gov/summit.html [Accessed February 9, 2007]. 
52  Sarah A. Lister, “An Overview of the U.S. Public Health System in the Context of Emergency 
Preparedness,” CRS Report for Congress (March 17 2005), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31719.pdf  [Accessed June 22, 2006]. 
53 Nicole Lurie et al, "Local Variation In Public Health Preparedness: Lessons From California," 
Health Affairs Public Health Preparedness Web Exclusive  (June 2, 2004). 
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the interface between emergency preparedness and other public health responsibilities.  
Pandemic influenza planning and surveillance for disease syndromes are two examples.54 
The challenge for public health is in how to meet the requirements for surge 
capacity in the 21st century healthcare environment.  Epidemiology and response to 
infectious disease has historically been a benchmark of the public health mission, but 
significant changes in science and society have resulted in the current need to revisit 
older public health intervention measures such as mass prophylaxis.  Following the polio 
vaccine mass vaccination campaigns in the early 1960s and the global eradication of 
smallpox in 1977, public health has limited experience with mass prophylaxis campaigns 
in response to a biological threat.   
Public health is seriously under funded.  The mean per capita spending for public 
health in 2004-2005 was $149, compared to $6,423 for overall health care.  Continued 
reductions in funding for essential public health services are projected.55  The public 
health workforce is aging, a substantial proportion of which is poised to retire in the next 
five years.  The number of public health workers dropped from 220 workers per 100,000 
Americans in 1980 to 158 workers per 100,000 Americans in 2000, according to the 
American Public Health Association.  In the next few years, state and federal public 
health agencies could lose up to half of their work force to retirement, the private sector 
and other opportunities.56  The citizens of the United States are aging.  In the next 25 
years, about one-fifth of all Americans will be age 65 or older. Twenty percent of all 
Americans, or about 70 million people, will pass their 65th birthday by 2030.  The effect 
of post 9/11 volunteerism has been well documented.  Commitment to volunteering 
increased by nearly 12 percent from 2002 to 2005, according to a new study by the Points 
of Light Foundation and the Volunteer Center National Network, with interest in 
                                                 
54  Nicole Lurie, Jeffrey Wasserman, and Christopher D. Nelson, "Public Health Preparedness: 
Evolution Or Revolution?" Health Affairs 25, no. 4 (July/August 2006). 
55  "The Government Performance Project: A Case of Neglect," Governing.Com (February 2004), 
http://www.governing.com/gpp/2004/public.htm  [Accessed October 27, 2006]. 
56  Courtney M. Perlino, “The Public Health Workforce Shortage: Left Unchecked, Will we be 
Protected?”  American Public Health Association (September, 2006), 
http://www.apha.org/NR/rdonlyres/597828BF-9924-4B94-8821-
135F665E9D45/0/PublicHealthWorkforceIssueBrief.pdf  [Accessed November 2, 2006]. 
55 
volunteering rising most quickly among people age 55 to 64.57   An under-funded public 
health system finds itself with an older workforce in an aging society that demonstrates 
an increasing interest in volunteerism.  This environment seems to be appropriate for the 
utilization of an MRC.  
The vision of public health surge capacity is one of a system that can protect the 
health of the community and prevent the spread of disease in response to biological or 
other large-scale emergencies.  This goal is accomplished by ensuring the capacity to 
rapidly expand beyond normal services to meet the increased demand for community-
based care through the use of community-based volunteers.  The public health system in 
the United States is not capable of meeting the surge capacity that is necessary during an 
emergency without developing additional support systems.   A health system's ability to 
expand its services rapidly depends on the availability of qualified personnel and their 
ability to perform tasks assigned to them.  Building a qualified workforce requires 
planners to recruit new types of health care professionals and ensure that they are 
prepared, able and willing to respond with the local system.  Consequently, a system to 
recruit, train, credential, protect and effectively activate a corps of volunteer health care 
providers to provide surge capacity must be the strategic goal of local public health 
systems. 
B. THE MRC VALUE PROPOSITION 
Most simply said, the public health system cannot do it alone.  Since 2002, public 
health agencies have used several staffing models to estimate the resources needed to 
dispense prophylactic medications to their entire population in a 48-hour time period.  
Most of these agencies have determined that they are not able to meet this target 
capability themselves.  To reach the 1.35 million people in Nassau County, New York, 
the Health Department would need to operate 35 points of distribution (PODs) on a 24-
hours a day basis, requiring over 5,000 staff. Staffing models and actual exercises 
repeatedly demonstrate the need to develop strategies to meet surge staffing for rapid 
distribution of public health countermeasures such as antibiotics or vaccinations. 
                                                 
57  Deloitte & Touche, USA, LLP, and Points of Light Foundation, 2006 Deloitte/Points of Light 
IMPACT Study (2006), 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_pointsoflight_executivesummary.pdf  [Accessed 
November 3, 2006]. 
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The strategy of organizing a Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) to address public 
health surge capacity has both a great value in its utility to meet surge capacity and is also 
a completely new and innovative idea.  Founded in 2002, MRC units are community-
based, locally organized and utilize volunteers who want to donate their time and 
expertise to prepare for and respond to emergencies.  MRC units strengthen the public 
health infrastructure of their communities and are valued by the public health agency for 
their ability to meet a real need and innovative in design and recognition.  Unlike the 
federal medical response programs such as the Health and Human Service’s Disaster 
Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), federal commitment and participation in local 
events brings no unique recognition to the volunteer.   Medical Reserve Corps have 
several significant and unique advantages: MRC units respond rapidly, are under local 
command and protocol, can quickly adapt to local needs and, perhaps most importantly, 
have a primary commitment to respond in their own community.    Figure 15 depicts a 
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Figure 15.   Strategy Canvas: Meeting Local Public Health Surge Capacity Needs 
 
This study benchmarks the strategic issues of ability and willingness of MRC 
volunteers to report to work with the health department though the use of an anonymous 
survey that was distributed to all 324 members of the Nassau County Department of 
Health Medical Reserve Corps between July and September 2006.  Data was gathered on 
the responses of the MRC members relating to these two constructs in the context of their 
membership with this specific organization.  Responses were analyzed and assessed 
against the benchmark of reduction or removal of the barriers to ability and willingness.    
C. BUILDING AN MRC FRAMEWORK  
In Blue Ocean Strategy, Kim and Mauborgne describe tipping point leadership as 
an approach that manages the key organizational hurdles of change including cognitive 
resistance, resource limitations, motivational weakness and political barriers.   Tipping 
point leadership ignores the conventional wisdom that change is dependent on resources 
and time and instead focuses on points of disproportionate influence.58   
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School Press, 2005), 240. 
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The health care system has recognized the problems of hospital overcrowding and 
lack of surge capacity for many years.  Following the anthrax releases in 2001, public 
health also recognized that their fragile infrastructure is unable to support the extensive 
epidemiological surveillance, investigations and mass prophylaxis systems that is now 
necessary.  Most every public health professional understand the current public health 
workforce can no longer handle public health surge capacity alone.  The survey of MRC 
volunteers results in a clearer understanding of who these individuals are and how to 
elicit the issues that interfere with their motivation to report to work. 
The MRC volunteers are ten years older than average health care professionals 
and may be unable or unwilling to report to work even though they frequently respond 
affirmatively when questioned about their intent. Unlike the research on paid health care 
professionals, MRC volunteers may say ”yes” even when their concerns and situations 
may actually result in a more accurate answer of “no”.  Cognitive dissonance and 
motivational forces active in the process of volunteering may cause this group of 
volunteers to experience difficulty recognizing their own barriers to response.  Systems 
must be in place to elicit information on potential barriers and establish programs to meet 
those needs in order to improve MRC response in a disaster.  
New funding mechanisms quickly, if not satisfactorily, addressed resource 
distribution following 2001 with significant federal preparedness monies directed to 
states and locals.  Although funding of several core public health programs were actually 
cut, federal funding targeted to preparedness was established and core capacity standards 
identified.  Additionally, in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security Citizen Corps 
funding was directed specifically to the Medical Reserve Corps to establish local 
volunteer medical professionals to address local community need. 
This study demonstrates the need to reallocate and redesign resource systems to 
reduce or resolve barriers for the MRC volunteer.  Professional liability protections must 
be ensured and support service programs for MRC member families during deployment 
such as sheltering, dependent care and assurance of provision of protective measures 
must be developed.  Transportation resources were also identified as a very important 
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concern for the volunteer.  Both the need for transportation and the need for assurances of 
unrestricted passage to the worksite are resource-related concerns.   
Political barriers for the MRC organization include public health staff who may 
feel threatened by volunteers performing work they routinely perform, hospital 
administrators who perceive MRC members as being drawn from hospital staff with 
acute care responsibilities and local government officials who must assume the liability 
for MRC professional actions while working for the health department.  The hospitals 
were assured that MRC members would be recruited from areas of practice outside the 
acute care setting.  Both public health and government experienced the value of MRC 
when they were activated and assisted in actual local emergent situations.  Coalitions 
were formed with the hospitals and a process developed to deploy MRC to hospitals in 
specific instances.  These changes have been incremental and validated by actual 
experiences.   
The potential for political hurdles remains, however, both for the MRC volunteer 
and in the widespread recognition of the preparedness disparities that exist for the poor, 
the homeless, the non-English speaking populations and the elderly.  MRC members 
report they are prepared to respond but they may not be accurate.  The local political 
leadership must support the message that barriers are recognized and systems are in place 
to address them to facilitate the volunteer’s response and ensure the success of future 
deployments.  The political cost of failure of an MRC response during a public health 
surge event would most likely result in the termination of the MRC strategy.   
Motivation to volunteer with the MRC is a product of the post 9-11 sense of 
community, as well as an opportunity for individuals to gain unique local recognition and 
association with a first responder organization.  Although sometimes seen as “resume 
building,” MRC members are under no obligation to respond to any event, and 
membership provides little incentive other than personal satisfaction.  Similar to recent 
research on paid health care workers ability and willingness to report to work during an 
emergency, barriers exist for the MRC volunteer, and the barriers are quite similar. 
Thus, using the principles of tipping point leadership, motivation is the primary 
organizational barrier to establishing a MRC that will meet the needs of public health 
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surge capacity.  Recent studies of paid health care workers identify ability and 
willingness as the two barriers that interfere with intention to report to work in an 
emergency. Ability is defined as the capability (capacity) of the individual to report to 
work and willingness is defined as the personal decision (motivation or desire) to report 
to work.  Qureshi59 reports that health care workers are most able to report to work for a 
mass casualty incident, environmental disaster and chemical event and least able to report 
during a smallpox epidemic, radiological event, SARS outbreak or severe snow storm.  
Barriers to ability include transportation and family care.  Health care workers were are 
willing to report during a snowstorm, mass casualty incident or environmental disaster, 
and least willing to report during a SARS outbreak, radiological event, smallpox 
epidemic or chemical event.  Barriers to willingness are fear and concern for family and 
personal health. 
The existing literature concludes that the key ingredients to volunteering are 
ability and willingness, both of which are primarily interpreted as motivational issues.  
Ability, however, is usually understood as the capability of overcoming a variety of 
resource constraints.  The literature on volunteerism describes volunteers, in general, as 
being motivated by a deeply rooted altruism which appear to overcome resource 
constraints such as transportation, other work duties and general family responsibilities. 
However, this study of MRC volunteers suggests that, even when altruism is 
strong, there are real resource constraints, there are real political hurdles, and there are 
still real motivational and cognition hurdles, although volunteers are likely to respond in 
a very different manner than paid staff.   
Cognitive dissonance may explain why this group of volunteers has difficulty 
recognizing their personal barriers to response.  Is it not cognitive dissonance, for 
example, for volunteers who report they are able and willing to volunteer to say at the 
same time that there are many obstacles to their participation?  Is it not cognitive 
dissonance that these volunteers simultaneously say that the hospital and county are 
prepared, but that the poor, the homeless, the elderly, and the non-English speakers are 
not prepared at all?   
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
MRC members identify safety and security of their families, adequate training, 
facilitated travel and site access and personal protective measures as assisting them in 
fulfilling their roles during a disaster.  Initiatives must reflect and specifically address the 
potential resource constraints, political and cognition hurdles and motivational barriers 
for these health care volunteers.  Public health agencies that plan to use volunteers to 
meet surge capacity must commit to effective partnerships with other municipal and 
community-based organizations to seek feasible solutions to response barriers.  
The recommendations of this study are organized according to the four 
organizational hurdles to change: cognitive resistance, resource limitations, motivational 
weakness and political barriers.  They focus on areas with uncontested space rather than 
competing for the same limited resources and time.   
Resource distribution recommendations ensure the availability of systems and 
services necessary to facilitate the deployment of volunteers.  Recommended actions 
include the following: 
• Municipalities should develop a system of providing professional liability 
protections for MRC members through use of local administrative laws 
that recognizes the volunteer as an agent of the sponsoring governmental 
agency. 
• Volunteers identify transportation as a very important concern.  Both the 
need for transportation and the need for assurances of unrestricted passage 
to the worksite are resource-related concerns.  Municipal transportation 
and planning agencies can utilize available public transportation systems 
to develop a system to transport MRC volunteers from designated 
collection points to their work locations.  Police Department and other 
public safety organizations including the county Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) can develop a recognized MRC identification to 
ensure passage through roads to report to the work site.     
• Support service programs for MRC member families must be developed 
and include planning for sheltering, “at-home” support for dependents and 
pets and a plan for provision of protective measures for the families of 
volunteers.  A best practice for MRC organizations would be a program 
within the organization that provides the supportive care necessary to 
enable the member to report to work.  This “Responders First” model 




of the organization and primary to the ability of the MRC member to 
perform any other community work.  The Citizen Corps CERT teams may 
be an ideal partner in this effort. 
Motivational recommendations increase the value proposition of volunteering.  
Recommended actions include the following: 
• Hospitals should be perceived as partners and not competitors for staffing 
during health care surges.  Health department-sponsored MRCs should 
have a Steering Committee that includes regional hospital members and 
develop a system to share MRC resources between the community and the 
acute care settings.  
• Health care professional associations such as the AMA and the ANA 
should recognize, actively recruit and support members to volunteer in 
their local community.  The value of these activities can be reinforced and 
promoted through continuing medical education credits and reduced 
membership benefits. 
• Municipalities may extend the benefits provided to other volunteer 
emergency responders such as tax credits and pension plans to MRC 
members.  
• Planned exercises that include the deployment of registered MRC 
volunteers should include a system to document those volunteers who are, 
in fact, unable to respond.  Efforts must continue to understand the extent 
of the problem and the barriers that are present.  
Cognitive recommendations enable both MRC managers and volunteers to 
recognize that even well-meaning volunteers have real and personal barriers to 
responding, have a potential for experiencing cognitive dissonance and may, in fact, be 
quite fearful of responding to a public health emergency.  Systems should be in place to 
elicit information on potential barriers and establish programs to meet those needs in 
order to improve MRC response in a disaster.  Recommended actions include the 
following: 
• The initial orientation and credentialing of MRC volunteers should include 
a form that identifies all possible barriers to responding.  Including this 
form as part of the standard MRC enrollment process provides the 
information to the sponsoring agency and may also communicate to the 
volunteer those barriers are expected, understood and will be addressed.   
• The initial orientation and credentialing of MRC volunteers should include 
a self-assessment of experience, clinical abilities and perceived training 
needs. Including this form as part of the standard MRC enrollment process 
communicates to the volunteer that necessary training will be provided to 
meet role expectations.   
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• Provide opportunities for clinical experiences in public health that are 
similar to activities required in an emergency.  For example, MRC 
members can work with public health epidemiologists for case 
investigations of routine communicable diseases to understand the process 
of dealing with communicable disease investigations and reduce the fear 
of working with infectious disease.  
• This study demonstrates that individuals who report that they are less 
likely to respond to emergency events identify lack of training as a barrier 
to response.  Training curriculums for MRC members must meet the 
identified training needs of the MRC member, with their direct input.  The 
training provided must meet the training needs identified by the 
individual, or they will continue to perceive lack of training as a barrier to 
response.    
Political recommendations recognize the potential effects of both enabling and 
oppositional forces of vested interests or stakeholders on the success of meeting public 
health surge capacity with community volunteers. Recommended actions include the 
following: 
• MRC members report they are able and wiling to respond, but that 
assessment may not be accurate.  The local political leadership must 
support the message that barriers are recognized and systems are in place 
to address them to facilitate the volunteer’s response and ensure the 
success of future deployments.  Local and state regulations that enable 
volunteer firefighters to meet their community emergency responsibilities 
should be extended to MRC members.  MRC organizations should seek 
memorandums of understanding with private employers to facilitate their 
employees’ local emergency response.    
• The second political hurdle this study identifies is disparity.  The political 
cost of emergency preparedness disparities for poor, homeless, and elderly 
was quite evident following Hurricane Katrina and remains a huge factor 
in developing an effective public health surge capacity strategy.  These 
groups, and other communities of people with special needs, have not as 
yet adequately integrated preparedness and response planning.  MRC 
members and their sponsoring agencies must recognize the challenges of 
providing culturally competent services within these communities and 
develop strategies that translate preparedness and response information.  
MRCs may look to developing partnerships with community-based 
agencies that service these populations to deliver preparedness information 
and to develop MRC volunteers within these communities.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The model of using community-based volunteer health professionals to meet local 
public health surge capacity is intuitively reasonable and highly effective as demonstrated 
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in many actual emergency events.  This study suggests that volunteer motivation and the 
possible effects of cognitive dissonance may affect the responses of volunteers when they 
are asked if they are able and willing to respond to an emergency, and their responses 
may be quite different than posing this question to paid healthcare staff.  The volunteers 
belonging to an identified emergency response organization such as the MRC may 
exacerbate this difference.   
MRC members report they are prepared to respond but that assessment may not 
be completely accurate.  This study reveals the need for organizational mobilization, new 
program initiatives and an acknowledgement that even volunteers have constraints.  
These conclusions may greatly impact the potential volunteer population as a whole.  
Perhaps the focus on “ability and willingness” is too restrictive and may obscure the 
significance of programs that recruit, educate, nurture and enable volunteers to work.  
Public health leaders recognize the need for local volunteer health professionals in 
meeting public health surge capacity demands.  This study demonstrates that it is simply 
not enough to ask volunteers if they can and will respond to an emergency.  In many 
ways, it is similar to asking volunteer firefighters if they will respond to a fire.  They 
almost always respond affirmatively, but there may be many barriers that actually 
interfere.  Regardless of what the volunteers say, jurisdictions need initiatives, programs 
and resources to ensure a sufficient public health response to emergencies.    
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